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Abstract 
In Moroccan history, Sufis maintained close ties with the makhzan, the sharifian state. 
Nevertheless, these ties were predicated on a balance of power relations between the two 
sides. A great deal of existing sources deal primarily with political activism and mystical 
aspects of the Sufi orders. Yet, researchers have neglected the rather complicated and 
nuanced connection between religious dimension and political landscapes of the sharifian 
state. Thus, this tendency has led to potential bias and, at worst, false pictures of the 
religio-political role of Sufism in interacting with the central sultanate in 
pre-protectorate-period Morocco. 
This thesis proposes a new interpretation of the shifting relationship between Sufism 
and the Moroccan state in the early twentieth century. More specifically, it explores the 
Kettaniyya order as tangible evidence of the link between the spiritual guidance of the 
Sufi cheikh and his ideals of preserving religious legitimacy and ensuring national 
security between 1908 and 1909. Mohammed Al-Kettani, the leader of the brotherhood, 
had borne tremendous ire against the Alaouite sultan, Abdel-Hafid, for his failure to 
maintain order in Morocco. I argue that the effort to ensure the religious legitimacy of the 
Kettaniyya Sufi order was the main vehicle for Mohammed Al-Kettani’s challenge to the 
political structures of Abdel-Hafid. The deployment of the baraka power in tandem with 
his symbolic weight paved the road for the creation of an institutional framework that 
unified rural allies to counter the Alaouite state. Henceforth, a nuanced and critical 
analysis of existing studies of the Sufi cheikh facilitates an understanding of a variety of 
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profound and essential facets of the Kettaniyya order between 1908 and 1909.  
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Even if I converted, my experience of living the religion could never be Moroccan, because I am 
not Moroccan and can’t erase the years in which my own cultural sense of religion has been so 
deeply imprinted onto me. I’m embarrassed that I continued to cling for so long to the vague 
Orientalist fantasy.  
--Rachel Newcomb “A Distant Episode” 
Introduction 
Newcomb, an American author married to a Moroccan Muslim, was eager to visit a 
Sufi tomb in Morocco for her anthropology research and learn more about saintly life via 
interviews with Moroccans. Contrary to the hope of obtaining information on Sufism and 
Sufi saints, the author realized it was difficult to reconcile her own personal status, as a 
Western Christian, with the Muslim community in the country. Furthermore, her desire 
for conversion to Islam had run into obstacles because of her long-lasting passion for “the 
vague Orientalist fantasy,” that is, the obsession with Sufi dance, poetry, religious 
practices, and other exotic cultural production. 1  Acknowledging the number of 
Orientalists, colonial administrators, and outsiders who consistently provide biased 
pictures and tendentious statements about places like Morocco, Newcomb felt 
embarrassed, albeit unsurprised, when she perceived that the locals had been wary of her 
true intentions. Anecdotes like this one sparked my passion to critically and contextually 
explore the interplay between religion and history in Morocco. As a Chinese student who 
does not have any religious background and is interested in Middle Eastern Studies and 
Islam, I have to be as considerate and rational as possible when evaluating other cultures, 
religions, and histories. Especially in academic projects, as in the case of Newcomb, 
																																																								
1	 Rachel Newcomb, “A Distant Episode: Religion and Belief in Moroccan Ethnography,” in 
Encountering Morocco: Fieldwork and Cultural Understanding, ed. David Crawford & Rachel 
Newcomb (Indiana University Press, 2013), 143. 
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positionality must be accounted for in order to minimize bias and comprehend the 
sources.  
Hence, one of the main purposes of this thesis is to complicate some widespread 
generalizations by illuminating an important example of Sufism as a spiritual and 
political phenomenon. It also seeks to question and cast doubts on some distorted 
perspectives from Western scholars toward Sufism in Morocco. More specifically, this 
thesis investigates the Kettaniyya order as tangible evidence of the link between the 
spiritual guidance of the Sufi cheikh and his ideals of preserving religious legitimacy and 
ensuring national security between 1908 and 1909. Through the examination of this 
particular religious order, one is able to map out the shifting relationship between the Sufi 
leader and the political structure of Morocco, the sharifian state led by Alaouite sultans. 
In carrying out this research, I have tried to keep in mind and be considerate of potential 
bias and misunderstanding on the Moroccan context, especially when considering source 
material from outside observers.  
Sufi orders have been present in Morocco since at least the 12th century. Believers 
have preached Islamic doctrines and Sufi principles to uneducated farmers, rural villagers, 
and marginalized communities in the Rif regions, far away from the urban settings. 
Because Sufis explore internally hidden aspects of spirits and personal enlightenment, 
they have been seen as an apolitical entity, especially in recent times. In Moroccan 
history, however, Sufis maintained close ties with the makhzan, the sharifian state. They 
were mutually interdependent, as the sultan relied on Sufi cheikhs to strengthen his role 
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as Ameer Al-Moumineen while the Sufis were in need of economic protection and 
recourse from the state. Without doubt, this mutual interplay was predicated on the use of 
power and the consistence of interchange between both sides. In some instances, 
especially following the Pan-Islam trend that had united the Muslim umma, or the 
Muslim community, in order to counter the French forces into the Moroccan territory in 
the late 19th century, Sufi communities were willing to cooperate with the sultanate, along 
with other Muslim tribal affiliations, for national stability;2 while in other occasions, they 
tended to challenge the central authority either for the latter’s failure of offering gifts and 
religious services or the incapability (and negligence) of protecting the nation from 
corruption and foreign invasions. As we shall see in this thesis, Mohammed Al-Kettani 
had borne tremendous ire against the Alaouite sultan for his failure to maintain order in 
Morocco between 1908 and 1909. In sum, despite their objective of ensuring social unity, 
cultural cohesion, and religious legitimacy, Sufis would resort to protests and resistance 
once contingent factors disturbed, or even subverted, the power balance with the state. 
In this thesis, I argue that the efforts of ensuring religious legitimacy of the 
Kettaniyya Sufi order was the main vehicle for the religio-political agenda of Mohammed 
Al-Kettani in challenging the political structures of Abdel-Hafid. This religious endeavor 
paved the way for the creation of an institutional framework that unified rural allies to 
counter the inefficacy of the Alaouite sultanate. This charismatic leader, in his 
																																																								
2	 This idea of unity and cohesion (or coalition) would constitute a very important strategy for 
tribes to rise up against any opposing parties. See Edmund Burke, “Pan-Islam and Moroccan 
Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912,” The Journal of African History 13, no. 1 
(1972): 115. 
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deployment of the baraka power, combined symbolic capital and religious vitality to 
intervene directly into Moroccan politics. 
 
 
Sources and limitations 
 It is no surprise to learn that Sufism plays an important, and, in some cases, a 
predominant role, in influencing the historicity and historiography of the Muslim nations. 
As a matter of fact, after a swift glance over the nature of Sufism and its historical impact 
on the process of nation building, I grew critical of this so-called “Islamic mysticism.” I 
am not intending to deny here the prominently “mystical” nature of Sufism, but, as 
Joseph Hill says in introducing the potential bias against this practice that it “was 
introduced throughout much of the now-predominantly Muslim world by scholars who 
practiced Sufism, and Sufi thought consequently permeated the default Islam, scholarly 
and otherwise.”3 According to Hill, the “default Islam” results from the scholarly 
prejudice against Sufism worldwide. It is shocking that a number of western modernists 
regard Sufism as a highly superstitious religious practice without practical values. The 
lack of a deepening study and a nuanced viewpoint has attributed a rather biased and 
tendentious trait to this terminology.  
A multitude of scholarly investigations have centered on the simple, ideological 
binaries of democracy vs. Islam (including Sufism), Christian vs. Muslim (including Sufi), 
and good vs. evil. The scarcity of a more authentic and objective perspective toward 
																																																								
3	 Joseph Hill, “Sufism between Past and Modernity,” in Handbook of Contemporary Islam 
and Muslim Lives, eds. M.Woodward and R.Luken-Bull (Springer Nature Switzerland, 2019), 2.  
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Sufism has led to such criticism. Therefore, it is essential to ensure impartiality and 
fairness in treating such kind of subject matter. In other words, one has to nuance and be 
critical about existing sources, be it intellectual undertakings or literary scholarships, for a 
clarified, detailed, and even an apologetic discourse of Sufism across continents, and, in 
this particular case, the colonial history of the Kettaniyya Sufi order par excellence.   
What is known about Mohammed Al-Kettani is derived primarily from French 
ethnographic studies and colonial journals, correspondences, reports, and memoirs from 
1907 to 1927. While such sources certainly provide significant perspectives on the life 
and times of the Sufi leader and his objectives, the over-reliance has led to a number of 
misconceptions about and prejudices against domestic society and monarchical regime.  
The political implications the Kettaniyya order, in particular, had long-lasting effects on 
the religious cohesion of the Sufi order between 1908 and 1909. Nonetheless, the 
academic interest of the French power had relied on their impression on the Moroccan 
religious rituals and their mystical aspects, and in turn, gravitated to underestimate the 
latter’s efficacy in modernizing/reforming the country. As I would argue throughout the 
thesis, the French presented a highly biased picture of the Kettaniyya movement without 
taking so much account on the Sufi legitimacy.  
 More specifically, because of the heavy concentration on the notion of “military” 
jihad and armed activism, experts have neglected the role of cultural resistance (i.e. 
symbolic capital of Al-Kettani and his pursuance of the greater jihad) in linking religious 
dimension to the historical context of colonialism in Morocco between 1908 and 1909. 
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Moreover, the little or no regular access to the Moroccan makhzan to conduct adequate 
studies on the country has been accountable for the failure to produce a functional 
analysis of the Kettaniyya resistance against the sharifian state.4 Thus, the colonial 
administrators and policy-makers had to rely on regular reports, existing travelogues, 
daily or weekly journals, rumors, and other media to refine their colonial archives for 
developmental and tactical usage. As later sections suggest, the French even supported 
and financed an arabophone newspaper, “The Sa’ada,” in order to promote their colonial 
ambitions and propagated European ideas in Morocco. Through the usage of the Arabic 
language as a medium to advance their project, the French regarded the newspaper 
production as an effective tool to foreground Al-Kettani’s hypocritical intention and 
highly militant behavior in an indirect way. Thus, an excessive reliance on these largely 
misguided sources without critically expressing a synthetic point of view would 
tremendously underestimate the profound and even authentic facet of Mohammed 
Al-Kettani and his intent as a Sufi leader. In this thesis, I examine French colonial sources 
alongside recent scholarship to propose a new interpretation of the shifting relationship 
between Sufism and the Moroccan state in the early twentieth century. Through a careful 
and critical evaluation of existing studies, one is able to garner a set of invaluable 




4	 Edmund Burke, “The Invention of Moroccan Islam,” in The Ethnographic State: France 
and the Invention of Moroccan Islam (University of California Press, 2014), 172. 
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The notion of segmentation 
 Since Sufi brotherhoods are centered on the rural region far from the urban space in 
Morocco, a general glance at the tribal system and the notion of segmentation will 
facilitate deeper understanding of the functionality and mechanism of maintaining 
internal order among each tribe. According to Ernest Gellner, a well-known social 
anthropologist, the theory of segmentation is defined as the practice of social cohesion 
without regulation from central authority.5 Segmentation is different from tribalism 
because the former concentrates on the “balancing and opposition of constituent groups” 
through social and political interests without interventions from authority, while the latter 
is, more or less, subject to central authority.6 Segmentation applies to many tribal 
societies with various effects. At least in the Moroccan Sufi case, however, it is not 
always the case that this system of segmentation maintains tribal order in the rural society. 
Its stability and maintenance are predicated on coherent regional authorities and their 
power to challenge the national government, or makhzan, when it becomes incapable of 
controlling outside forces within the country. This section will provide a general view of 
segmentary theory and its pertinence to the dynamics of political dissent and conflict in 
Moroccan’s urban and rural spaces, especially between 1908 and 1909.  
 In terms of gathering regional notables and religious disciples for social cohesion, the 
clear-cut boundaries between each tribe consolidate their inner circle. These bonds 
promote coherence and uniformity among tribal and Sufi forces in order to check and 
																																																								
5	 Ernest Gellner, “The Problem,” in Saints of the Atlas (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 
1969), 41.	
6	 Ibid., 42.  
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challenge any opposing parties within and without the country.7 The close bond of the 
segmentation is largely due to the emergence of highly capable groups/actors who are 
eager to challenge the foreign invasion in defending the domestic state and their 
communities. The role of religion in maintaining social order has refined the traditional 
system of segmentation and cohesion. The bonds still exist but religious saints have to 
abide by the Islamic shari’a besides their tradition customs, or the urf.8 Therefore, the 
Islamic/Sufi saints have their own systematic and interdependent approach toward 
maintaining tribal and religious order.  
 Mohammed Al-Kettani, the Sufi leader of the Kettaniyya brotherhood in rural 
Morocco, stood out as a prominent religious figure who sought to challenge and oppose 
the sultan’s regime in not fulfilling his promises after his enthronement in 1907, which 
included the containment of foreign power. The subsequent events between 1908 and 
1909 foregrounded the political and religious presence of the Kettaniyya order that 
Al-Kettani led. The highly political-oriented segmentation mechanism he adopted 
emphasized the institutionalization of the Sufi community. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the French colonial administrators observed 
closely the action and attitude of the Moroccan tribal and Sufi forces in the rural regions. 
Therefore, they discovered the trace of “an organized solidarity” within cohorts of the 
Sufi order, which fostered the latter’s internal uniformity and cohesion. According to the 
colonial report in 1925, “they (the administrators) found in the brotherhood a very large 
																																																								
7	 Ibid., 42. 
8	 I drew this piece from lecture notes and presentation while in Morocco last year, in the 
class of “The Political System of the Maghreb.”  
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clan, led by chief who provided housing and economic provisions on an individual basis. 
It was a step toward organized solidarity.”9 This “organized solidarity” not only made 
possible independent mechanisms of socio-economic welfare and support within tribal 
and religious circles, but also, at least partially, fulfilled the spiritual satisfaction of their 
members. This description is important in that it helps to explain the cohesiveness of Sufi 
allies under the leadership of Mohammed Al-Kettani. I argue that French recognition of 
this “organized solidarity” during the incidents between 1908 and 1909 motivated their 
later profound research on the Sufi leaders in Moroccan rural society. My analysis of 
some of this research highlights the way different aspects of religious “solidarity,” such 
as rituals and collective da’awa, contributed to the internal cohesion and unity of the 
Kettaniyya order. Furthermore, it illuminates the changing orientation of Mohammed 
Al-Kettani and his allies between 1908 and 1909, which fused religious legitimacy with 
political mobilization for the sake of national and religious interests. The ambivalent 
relationship with different political actors in the country mapped out the politically 
adversarial nature of the Kettaniyya Sufi group under the leadership of the Sufi cheikh. 
 
Mohammed Al-Kettani: a guardian of Sufi tradition 
Before investigating deeper the personality and religio-political strategy of the Sufi 
cheikh, it is essential to lay out the geographical significance in relation to the power 
struggle between the French, the Alaouite sultan, and the Sufi leader. Fes, the then capital 
																																																								
9	 La Pensée Française: Organe D’expansion Française et de Propagation Nationale, 1925, 
2.  
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city of Morocco, was the battleground between Bilad al-makhzan, the land of the 
sharifian central authority in the urban setting, and Bilad al-siba, the land of dissidence in 
remote mountainous regions where most Berbers and rural notables were residing. The 
proximity between both sides not only reinforced their close ties and connections, be it 
cooperation or clashes, but also contained the French power from imposing control over 
the city. Especially in the pre-protectorate-period Morocco, the interaction between the 
urban space and the rural area had posed a real threat to French (European) penetration in 
the early 20th century.10 It was not until 1912 had the capital city moved from Fes to 
Rabat. The relocation of the capital (and also the sultan) to the coastal area had facilitated 
French penetration into the country, both because of its relatively easier communication 
with the metropolis and its absence from disturbances from nearby tribes. After all, the 
period of 1908-1911 marked a crucial transition to a relatively loose connection between 
the two regions. This “divorce” and rift of both sides would function as a drive for the 
French to effectively establish the protectorate land in Morocco in 1912. 
Born in Fes in 1873, Mohammed Al-Kettani was one of the most important Sufis of 
early 20th century Morocco. He was among the most prominent figures of the Idrisside 
lineage, founded during the medieval period. The Idrissides traced descent from the 
Prophet Mohammed, earning members of the lineage the honorific “sharif” and 
enhancing the saintly authority of Sufi leaders like Al-Kettani. However, other lineages 
also claimed descent from the Prophet, notably the Alaouites, who had ruled the Kingdom 
																																																								
10	 Burke, “Fez and the Muslim City,” in The Ethnographic State, 149. 
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of Morocco since the mid-17th century.11 The position of the sharifian Alaouite sultan 
was entitled the Ameer Al-Moumineen, or the Commander of the Faithful, the supreme 
religious authority in Morocco.12 The similar claims to religious and political authority of 
these two lineages paved the way for later interactions, be it cooperation or conflicts. As a 
matter of fact, Mohammed Al-Kettani’s fame as an important political and saintly figure 
could be said to have made conflict with the Alaouite sultan inevitable. In fact, the power 
of the prestigious Idrisside lineage extended politico-religious legitimacy to the entire 
Kettaniyya order.13 This claim to legitimacy paved the road for Al-Kettani’s subsequent 
mobilization against polarized factions in the country.  
One of the mobilization strategies of Al-Kettani was to wage the greater jihad, the 
spiritual struggle in defense of Islam and its doctrines. It was this kind of “ ‘spiritual 
pathway’ that could unite the Sufi group together in order to wipe out all infidels and 
invaders who threatened the collective benefits and legitimacy of the Muslims, including 
the Sufis.”14 Al-Kettani unwaveringly waged this greater jihad for the sake of revealing 
his staunch and steadfast attitude toward the enemies, whether the domestic sultan or the 
foreign colonial forces.  
In addition, Mohammed Al-Kettani upheld a particular point of view on the 
																																																								
11	 One should keep in mind that there are other ruling families who claimed religious power 
in the country, including the Sa’adis. For the main purpose of this thesis, however, I will only 
discuss the conflicts between the Alaouites and the Idrisside’s descendant of Mohammed 
Al-Kettani.  
12	 Bulletin de l’enseignement public (Protectorat de la République française au Maroc, 1926), 
60.	
13	 Ibid., 60.	
14	 Cheikh Anta Babou, “The Emergence of Amadu Bamba, 1853-95,” in Fighting the 
Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2007), 58. I used this source as a major secondary source to the seminar paper 
last semester in the class of “Senior Seminar in International Studies.” 
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interpretation and reasoning strategy of religious texts. One of the most significant 
aspects of his approach was “the claim to interpretative authority on the basis of 
esotericism rather than exotericism (Sufism rather than Fiqh).”15 Al-Kettani represented 
an ahistorical Sufi who engaged in the ijtihad, or personal endeavor in interpreting the 
Sufi/Islamic creeds and sacred texts, rather than historical (and contextual) modes of 
interpretation associated with Fiqh, or the traditional practice of Islamic jurisprudence. 
The fundamental demarcation between his approach and that of the urban scholarly 
classes, as shall be discussed more extensively in the next section, was the different 
extent of emphasis on rationally interpreting/consulting the Islamic principles. After all, 
the perception of Al-Kettani’s national and religious interest, through his own 
comprehension of interpretational authority, deemed him a popular figure in his Sufi 
circle. Before probing deeper into a detailed layout of Al-Kettani’s political mobilization 
vis-à-vis the national sultan, the act of the greater jihad of the Sufi leader was undertaking, 
prior to the official time when Morocco had fallen into the French protectoral 
administration in 1912, shall shed light on the context of their adversarial nature.   
Mohammed Al-Kettani assembled rural tribes and Sufis to unanimously encourage 
Abdel-Hafid, the then Alaouite sultan of Morocco from 1908 to 1912, to fulfill the 
promises he had made as part of the conditional allegiance, or the bay’a, including just 
rule and political transparency, avoidance of consulting foreign power on domestic issues, 
full readiness to contain any outside attacks, and other conditions that dealt with ensuring 
																																																								
15	 Sahar Bazzaz, “Challenging Power and Authority in Pre-Protectorate Morocco: Shaykh 
Muhammad Al-Kattani and the Tariqa Kattaniyya.” (PhD dissertation. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 14.	
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domestic peace.16 Nonetheless, under pressure from the French administration in the 
country, Abdel-Hafid did not fulfill his promises when taking over the sultanate in 1909, 
which led to the uprising of the Kettaniyya brotherhood in the same year.17 This event 
planted the seed for ongoing conflicts and clashes between rural Sufi orders and the 
makhzan, which sparked a large scope of mobilization. 
In his lifetime as a devout Sufi believer, Mohammed Al-Kettani conducted esoteric 
behavior in almost all aspects of his life. This ascetic performance entailed the 
“abstinence from European production and worldly consumption and fully abidance by 
the laws of God in all aspects of life.”18 The staunch upholding of Sufi Islamic doctrines 
served as a basis for the leader’s assemblage of rural disciples and Berbers, who were 
willing to follow the religious cheikh, or the saint. This fundamental principle would 
constitute one of the competing factors between Mohammed Al-Kettani and the urban 
ulama, who were aligned with the Alaouite sultan.  
Despite the importance to his followers of his esoteric and ascetic persona, the 
religious and political orientation of Mohammed Al-Kettani shifted dramatically as 
French power in the country increased. In contrast to the previous ultra-ascetic life of a 
Sufi, Al-Kettani sought to pursue the Sufi-Salafist route in his later phases of career. The 
Salafiyya doctrines centered on the return to the pure Islam of the prophetic eras under 
the leadership of the rightly guided Companions and Caliphs. Nonetheless, as this 
																																																								
16	 Retrieved from an online article content called “Ulma Nasihon: Mohammed Ibn 
Abdel-Kabir Al-Kettani.” 
17	 Trenga and Maitrot de la Motte Capron, Journal D’un Israélite de Fès, 1908-1910, 126.  
18	 Henry Munson, “Al-Kattani and the Ulama (1904-1909),” in Religion and Power in 
Morocco (Yale University Press, 1993), 62. 
20	
ideology developed in response to European colonialism in the region, Salafists were 
willing to adopt certain technologies and values associated with European modernity, 
such as the popularity of print journalism, to the extent that Islamic political and religious 
thought would flourish.19 Henceforth, the Sufi cheikh combined both Sufi and Salafist 
dogmatic and practical strategies for religious legitimacy with the goal of establishing a 
“representative constitutional regime” in the country.20 He believed that the imposition of 
this regime would strengthen the religious legitimacy of both Sufi saints and the sultanate 
in the country and provide a check against French incursions.  
When he traveled to Egypt and Mecca between 1903 and 1904, Al-Kettani witnessed 
European colonialism as an authoritarian and hegemonic project, la mission civilisatrice, 
in the language of the French power.21 The awareness of imperial encroachment served 
as an impulse toward further recruitment and assemblage of rural elites in order to 
counter outside forces. The increasing number of Sufis attracted the attention from the 
makhzan, headed by the Alaouite sultan.  
Al-Kettani’s combination of Sufi tradition and Salafist ideology elevated the 
widespread belief in his baraka, or charismatic blessing.22 Al-Kettani reconstituted, if not 
replaced, his esoteric Sufi life in reminding the ulama and other religious figures of the 
significance of jihad. This reformed strategy underscored his liability as a constant 
																																																								
19	 I retrieved all these characteristics of the Salafiyya movement from course lectures when I 
was in Morocco in 2019, in which the class of “The Islamic World and the West” has contributed 
considerably to my understanding of conflicts and clashes between the western world and the 
Islamic Salafiyya thought, in addition to the Maghrebian region.  
20	 Abdellah Hammoudi, Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan 
Authoritarianism (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 17.	
21	 See “Muttasawaf Istihwatihim Al-sulta al-rabia’a” in the Assabah website page.	
22	 Munson, “Al-Kattani and the Ulama,” 63.  
21	
guardian of Islam. Henceforth, his embracing of both the power of baraka and the 
reformist idea not only further drew a great range of popular support from rural areas to 
wage jihad, but also stood out as a clear-cut challenge to the urban ulama, thus “adding to 
the aura of sanctity and mystery that surrounded him.”23 This served as a platform to 
attract a great deal of Sufi supporters and rural allies. Another objective of challenging 
the urban ulama was to establish a representative constitutional regime in the nation, that 
is, the fulfillment of the conditional allegiance from the Alaouite sultan. 24  This 
commitment to reform the central political regime is essential to understanding the 
Sufi-Salafist hybrid of Mohammed Al-Kettani’s reform project. 
The ambivalence of Mohammed Al-Kettani toward the urban ulama was not only 
predicated on doctrinal and practical differences, but also political differences. On the one 
hand, the Moroccan ulama “accused him of aspiring to replace Abd al-Aziz as sultan.”25 
Interestingly enough, it was actions of the ulama that led to the growing hostility between 
Abdel-Aziz and Al-Kettani since the urban scholarly classes questioned the legitimacy of 
the Sufi cheikh in 1896.26 This accusation of heresy vis-à-vis Al-Kettani propelled the 
Kettaniyya order’s uprising against Abdel-Hafid between 1908 and 1909.  
On the other hand and more importantly, Al-Kettani complained vigorously about the 
inability of the scholars to maintain national order when confronting with foreign colonial 
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forces, which led to the failure to contain them through the banner of Islam. According to 
him, the ulama focused exclusively on their own interests and personal fame—the role as 
Islamic authorities to interpret the religious texts of the Islamic religion and disseminate 
religious knowledge to the Muslim umma, or the community. Al-Kettani emphasized that 
this tremendously weakened the Muslims’ confrontation with the foreign power. In stark 
contrast with the conduct of the ulama, Mohammed Al-Kettani foregrounded the duty of 
Muslims/Sufis as guardians of Islam, which became more pronounced and prominent in 
his later endeavors, both religious and political. It is now time to turn to the religious and 
political struggle of Al-Kettani between 1908 and 1909 and how this influenced his 
legitimacy and popularity among the Kettaniyya brotherhood writ large.  
 
The seed and dissemination of jihad 
The French troops invaded Morocco in 1907, sending massive military forces to 
Rabat, Casablanca, and Marrakech. The French press and colonial administrators laid out 
the approximate number of troops, including cavalry and infantry.27 Furthermore, they 
mapped out the environmental and demographic information in large cities in order to 
better facilitate the colonial project.28 They even outlined the political and religious 
struggle between the Alaouite sultan and Mohammed Al-Kettani, in light of their 
divergent viewpoints toward Islam and their respective claims to authority. As 
Abdel-Hafid gathered urban elites and troops to topple Abdel-Aziz’s sultanate in 1908, 
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Mohammed Al-Kettani supported the former because he thought that the new sultan 
might rescue the nation from foreign encroachment, which was deteriorating the 
economic and social foundation of Morocco. Nonetheless, when the Sufi leader perceived 
the severe physical torture that Abdel-Hafid imposed upon his brother Abdel-Aziz instead 
of effectively containing the influx of the French troops, he was concerned and urged 
Abdel-Hafid to proclaim his authority on throne as a new Alaouite sultan in order to 
protect the country in 1908. 29  As mentioned earlier, the failed fulfillment of the 
conditional allegiance functioned as an impetus for Al-Kettani to mobilize the greater 
jihad against the sultan starting in late 1908. The troops of the sultanate soon subverted 
most of Al-Kettani’s forces, which led to his fleeing to Fes in 1909. A few months later, 
Abdel-Hafid captured the Sufi cheikh and beat him to death in May of the same year.30  
The events of 1908-1909 revealed Mohammed Al-Kettani’s ambivalent attitude 
toward both major political actors—the French colonial forces and the domestic sultan. 
His approach fused the maintenance of national order with religious legitimacy of the 
Kettaniyya brotherhood. His objective of organizing the Sufi forces in the rural regions 
signaled the starting point of large-scale opposition to Alaouite sultan.  
As aforementioned, the different attitude toward the interpretation of Islamic 
jurisprudence laid the foundation of the rivalry between Mohammed Al-Kettani and the 
urban ulama. As professional jurists and Islamic scholars, the ulama abided strictly by the 
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religious principles underlying the Islamic jurisprudential system, the ijma’, or the 
unanimous consensus, over the ijtihad.31  Al-Kettani, on the other hand, embraced 
personal endeavor in interpreting the Islamic shari’a.32 As a long-term struggle between 
the two sides, each faction regarded their respective principles, ijma’ and ijtihad, as more 
paramount than the other. It was Al-Kettani’s particular emphasis on personal effort in 
interpreting the sacred texts and shari’a of Islam that aroused the communal ire of the 
ulama, who defied and denounced unceasingly the Sufi leader as an “unorthodox 
figure.”33 This demarcation between an ahistorical viewpoint toward interpretation and a 
historical/classical treatment demonstrates not only the doctrinal differences between the 
two, but also the increasing entrenchment of both in their own ideological and religious 
cohorts. The rising fault line paved the road for later outright oppositions to and overt 
accusations against the sharifian sultan of Morocco. 
The political split between the Alaouite sultan and Mohammed Al-Kettani between 
1908 and 1909 initiated the waging of the greater jihad, in the extent that Al-Kettani 
fostered “spiritual pathway” toward his cohorts and allies for the defense of religious 
legitimacy and national security. The colonial journal depicted the strategies and the 
stages of the mobilization of the Sufi leader with a particular focus on its “fanatic 
militancy” and “armed violence.” However, I argue that this biased attitude toward 
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Al-Kettani’s intent had downplayed the essential meaning of “the greater jihad,” which, 
as mentioned earlier, stressed the religious and spiritual unity of the Muslim community 
in order to wipe out all threatening enemies and infidels. Therefore, the religious intention 
of the Sufi cheikh cemented his own symbolic capital and personality, prompting the 
popularity of his circles in combatting against polarized factions within the country. 
The morale of the Sufi “troops” was evident in that “every day, they held meetings 
on the subject of Djehad. To this enterprise, the fanatics donated considerable sums. The 
army chief was El Qittani.”34 The “donation” and “meetings” were important and 
proactive in this context because they reinforced the leadership of the Kettaniyya cheikh. 
The scale of Al-Kettani’s supporters was enormous relative to those of the sultan. As laid 
out also in the colonial correspondence in 1908, “Apart from the rural forces and the 
Fassis who continually showed up at El Qittani’s to be drafted, 10,000 infantrymen were 
at the disposal of El Qittani to leave at the first signal.”35 It is worth remarking that the 
scale of the Kettaniyya leader’s “army” that vied with the French invasion prior to the 
incident of Abdel-Hafid was much smaller than the one mentioned above. The 1908 
deployment was due to the changing attitude and strategy of Al-Kettani. The highly 
mobilized forces of the Kettaniyya brotherhood (and their allies) threatened the Alaouite 
sultan. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the purpose of Al-Kettani’s mobilizing his 
forces signified the spiritual jihad in conformance with the Islamic/Sufi principles. His 
approach was not meant to wage violent and physical war. As aforementioned, because of 
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its nature of being “a spiritual pathway” of uniting all pious believers, the greater jihad 
was a purely religious and spiritual undertaking. That was why Mohammed Al-Kettani, 
despite his hatred toward Abdel-Aziz, rejected simultaneously the brutal act of 
Abdel-Hafid toward his brother. 36  This deeper overtone emphasized the religious 
legitimacy and baraka power of the Sufi leader, in which this trait fostered a number of 
followers and allies in the rural region. 
The shifting power from the Alaouite sultan to the fierce Sufi leader, foregrounded 
his role not only as a religious reformer, but also a political actor within the framework of 
Sufi resistance against the Alaouite makhzan. Edmund Burke, a well-known specialist in 
Middle Eastern history and Oriental Studies, pinpointed the demarcation between the 
jihad of Abdel-Hafid and that of Mohammed Al-Kettani in that he stated that jihad “had 
important populist overtones and was able to gain broad support. Because of the broad 
and substantial appeal of its doctrine, it could provide a program and an ideology for 
movements as different as those of Abd al-Hafiz and of Al-Kittani.”37 In stressing the 
defining feature of jihad as “populist overtones,” “ a program,” and “an ideology,” it 
becomes clear that Al-Kettani’s mobilization strategy was distinct from that of the 
Alaouite sultan since the Sufi cheikh possessed baraka power and symbolic capital. Thus, 
his personality did appeal to Sufi supporters. The coherent power of Al-Kettani’s 
mobilization in the rural arena triggered large-scale dissent against the sultan and his 
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cohorts. Therefore, it operated as a base for unification and alignment within his own 
circles. 
Instead of stressing the violent and bellicose aspects of jihad, Burke conveys a vision 
of its pervasive influence and far-flung popularity among rural notables. Using the case of 
Mohammed Al-Kettani as a springboard, Burke provides on the one hand, a specific 
picture of the meaning of jihad in safeguarding national benefits and religious legitimacy 
of a particular Sufi figure, which explicitly promoted the coherency of the Sufi 
communities; on the other hand, he refines the notion of contested legitimacy against the 
political control of the sultanate regime between 1908 and 1909.  
 
The negotiation of power: The contentious nature of the king/saint relationship 
The ambivalent attitude of Mohammed Al-Kettani toward the Alaouite sultan was 
tantamount to the adversarial relationship between the sharifian state of Morocco and the 
symbolic capital of the Sufi leader. This particular contestation was based on the 
changing and dynamic power relation of king/saint in Morocco, especially the reasons 
and evident repercussions of this potential change. The king/saint relationship played a 
preponderant role in illustrating the salient nature between the two competing factions. 
The foundation of this balance between the two polarized factions stemmed from the 
dialectics of what Fatima Ghoulaichi called, “king/saint relationship.” According to her 
point of view, although the usage of the baraka was in tandem with the symbolic capital 
of either the sharifian sultan or the saintly cheikh, “the content and operation were highly 
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versatile. They were negotiated among king, saint, and the historical conditions which 
offered a range of possibilities that the saint and king must exploit.”38 Ghoulaichi 
pinpointed the inseparable linkage between the historical incidents in Morocco and the 
power negotiation of king/saint relationship. On the basis of historical documents by 
colonial officers regarding the treatment of Mohammed Al-Kettani after his rebellion 
against Abdel-Hafid, the latter fiercely imposed his anger upon the survivors of the 
campaign and the Kettani allies, who were subjected to successive beating and torturing 
but never admitted their defeat. 39  The violent operation against the Kettaniyya 
brotherhood showcased the tenuous relationship between the state and the religious saint 
in the rural region. In the wake of the “rebellion,” the sultanate sought to weaken Sufi 
(and tribal) communities in order to ensure sovereign power over Morocco, as a sharifian 
state.  
The highly contentious attitude of the sultan weakened the religio-political prestige 
of himself when confronting with Mohammed Al-Kettani’s resistance and his 
Sufi-Salafist viewpoint on this issue.40 This adversarial nature foregrounded his failed 
regime in the eyes of the Sufi leader. The French was struck by the fact that Al-Kettani 
had redirected the force of his opposition to the Alaouite sultan instead of the colonial 
forces, which had arrived in the country in 1907. The attitude of the Sufi cheikh was clear 
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when:  
The Kittani passed through Beni Mtir, an important tribe between Fez and Meknes. 
From there he proclaimed jihad but the sultan declared it unworthy. Kittani and his 
parties suggested that this movement was not directed against the French.41 
The plenipotentiary minister of France to Morocco, Regnault, drafted and wrote this 
statement to Pichon, the minister of foreign affairs, in order to inform him about the 
recent condition and deployment of the Kettaniyya brotherhood vis-à-vis the Alaouite 
sultan. In this message, Mohammed Al-Kettani was represented as “proclaiming his jihad” 
against an ineffective sultan who regarded the movement as “unworthy” and useless. This 
remark suggested that the French understood the Sufi cheikh’s opposition to the sharifian 
state to have surpassed his opposition to their own presence in the country. In other words, 
Regnault was expressing surprise that the Sufi cohorts were directing their power against 
their own sultan instead of the French armies.  
This shift highlighted the changing political orientation of Mohammed Al-Kettani 
vis-à-vis the sharifian sultan, which further widened the gap between the Alaouite throne 
and the Sufi saint. The antagonism between the two parties was cemented by the decision 
the Kettaniyya Sufi group to “rebel” against the state for the sake of religious legitimacy 
and national interests. The tension between the two factions revealed the considerable 
symbolic capital of the Sufi leader.  
Another effective factor in this dynamic relationship was the balance of cultural 
power between the Alaouite sultan and the Sufi leader. As mentioned earlier, the 
maintenance of power of the sultan was founded on the constant negotiation of contract 
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and allegiance, the bay’a. The failure of effectively negotiate or fulfill this contract would 
instigate popular uprisings, either from rural notables or urban elites. The colonial journal 
had documented some of the conduct of the Alaouite sultan since 1907. Nevertheless, the 
record was is full of terms such as “ardent,” “appalling,” and “excessive,” which might 
suggest a distorted picture of the critical events. Nevertheless, if read critically, such 
sources can help illuminate the nuances within this ongoing conflict, both in terms of 
religious jihad and political mobilization.  
According to the colonial officials, Abdel-Hafid’s abandonment of the conditional 
allegiance was due to his “drinking excessively of liquors and wine in defiance of the 
Koranic laws. Under the fury of insobriety, he indulged himself in appalling excesses. A 
great deal of ardent religious marabouts left him, including that of El-Kittani, who fled to 
Fes immediately.”42 Besides the inability to wage jihad against the occupying French 
forces, Abdel-Hafid may have been perceived as insufficiently pious by his subjects. This 
perception likely provoked Al-Kettani’s determination to call into question the legitimacy 
of the sharifian lineage and the claims to authority of the sultan, which in turn led to the 
massive uprising against the makhzan forces and the relative minimization (even 
abandonment) of mobilization against the French. This was a turning point in 
Al-Kettani’s strategy. His mobilization was henceforth directed at establishing a just and 
transparent “representative constitutional regime” for the country.  
Ultimately, this clash resulted in the sultan’s revenge and destruction of Al-Kettani’s 
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Sufi zawiya.43 The power relation is prominent in this context. When Abdel-Hafid 
perceived the latent threat of the Sufi cheikh in challenging his sharifian authority and 
national symbol as Ameer Al-Moumineen, the repercussion was catastrophic for 
Mohammed Al-Kettani. The Alaouite sultan brutally killed the Sufi cheikh and “secretly 
placed his corpse in the remote region away from pilgrimage sites, in fear of that place 
would later become a destination for pilgrimage and spiritual visitation.” 44  This 
displacement of the corpse (and tomb) manifested complicated power relation between 
the two parties, as the destruction and displacement of the saint’s tomb were considered 
religious blasphemy. In addition, the “secret” performance of burying the corpse of the 
Sufi leader showcased the fear of the sultan of massive revenge from various Sufi 
brotherhoods that were allied with the Kettaniyya order, indicating his awareness of the 
increasing polarization of the two factions.45 Apparently, Al-Kettani did not “survive” 
under successive repressions from the sharifian sultan, but one should not downplay the 
impact of power relation between the two political actors in a larger sense. The following 
section shall examine in detail the mobilization strategy of Mohammed Al-Kettani in 
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Cohesion and unity: paths towards consolidation  
Given the large-scale military forces and the strong regional interests within religious 
and rural communities in Morocco, including the Sufi orders, 46  the Alaouite 
administration enjoyed a somewhat stabilized system prior to the intrusion of the colonial 
forces in 1907. Nevertheless, the regional authorities/leaders, such as Mohammed 
Al-Kettani, challenged the centralization of the Alaouite tradition. Indeed, the tie between 
the sharifian state and the rural areas signified the ongoing division between two 
geographical spaces, with tension arising whenever either space sought to challenge the 
other in light of domestic or foreign turmoil. That said, the Sufi leader would have never 
achieved his prestige and power of jihad had he not promoted inner cohesion and unity of 
tribal system among his fellow disciples in his brotherhood. Between 1908 and 1909, 
Al-Kettani fused his political power with the communal support from a great deal of 
tribal and Sufi forces, which mainly operated as a stronghold withstanding any opposing 
parties and outside encroachment per se. The following discussion will center on his 
approach (es) that led to the rising power. 
As formulated in the theoretical section, the theory of segmentation provides a lens of 
regulating the interaction of political units in order to maintain order and control over 
highly diversified factions in the Moroccan tribal society. The coherence among group 
members and religious fellows serves as a significant premise of ensuring regulations and 
collective management in that the rural notables, under Mohammed Al-Kettani, tended to 
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be aligned with existing power for religious legitimacy and national security. However, 
the Sufi cheikh had to recourse to fight against French encroachment into the country and 
the failed regime of Abdel-Hafid and his cohorts. As a result, he chose to direct allies in 
order to root out the threatening factions. In the case of Mohammed Al-Kettani and his 
cohorts, the act of jihad and political resistance against Abdel-Hafid manifests the 
refinement of the entrenched theory of segmentation. The exclusion from the benefits of 
the political system led to challenges to the regime.47  
As mentioned earlier, the embarking of greater jihad under the leadership of 
Mohammed Al-Kettani attracted a large number of tribal leaders and religious followers 
in combatting against the weakened Hafidiyya regime. Abdel-Hafid’s retreat enraged a 
number of tribal leaders in that “they had been partisans of a militant anti-French stance. 
Much the same thing was true of the partisans of al-Kattani at Fez.”48 Burke pinpointed 
the united power of the “anti-French” forces in upholding Al-Kettani. Nonetheless, he 
used the word “militant” rather in an exaggerated manner as to signify the physical 
strength and scope of the military “troops” of the Sufi leader. As aforementioned, one has 
to be aware of the religious dimensions of the greater jihad in order to better understand 
the intention and political objective of the movement. In fact, Al-Kettani contributed to a 
massive amount of “militant forces” among rural populations for the sake of constituting 
a clear threat to the Alaouite sultan, as French forces had witnessed, while cementing his 
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religious ideology and goal as the guardian of Islam and charismatic leader.49  
Evidently, the traditional characteristic of the Moroccan tribal system relied upon the 
legitimation of baraka, blessing or charisma, of the Sufi saint, or leader. Mohammed 
Al-Kettani was one of the most prominent figures whose charisma has shaped his 
religious struggle against political and social corruption under the leadership of 
Abdel-Hafid between 1908 and 1909. This spiritual force not only operated as a 
foundation for his political resistance against the Alaouite sultan, but also his rallying 
strategy for attracting local supports. What is worth emphasizing is the indispensable role 
of kinship played in this leverage. Indeed, the basic element for social cohesion and 
solidarity was through kinship and family lineages. Ernest Gellner sheds light on the 
general traits of “legitimate ‘saints’ of the Atlas” as “charismatic leaders, who are 
identified and legitimated by the possession of baraka, but theirs is a charisma heavily 
routinized by kinship.”50 Gellner stressed the “routinization of kinship” in pinpointing 
the charismatic leaders of the religious saints. In other words, he emphasized both the 
conventional and religious features of any saint in the Moroccan rural regions. 
Mohammed Al-Kettani would have never acquired legitimate popularity without his 
charismatic power.  
In this context, kinship represented his Sufi followers in the Kettaniyya brotherhood; 
charisma signified his unremitting jihad and charismatic power in confronting with the 
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Alaouite sultan.51 A number of instances further cemented the ongoing power and 
popularity of Mohammed Al-Kettani in assembling his allies. The following sections 
manifest some concrete approaches of Mohammed Al-Kettani in reinforcing his religious 
legitimacy, including but not limited to, the popularity of print journalism and the 
unifying da’awa, or collective calling, that served as a tremendous impetus for his 
movement. 
 
The jumping point of printed culture: an alternative step toward legitimacy 
Culturally speaking, Mohammed Al-Kettani instrumentalized and mobilized his Sufi 
and tribal circles through the various standpoint and attitude toward modernized print 
journalism. This cultural-political agenda crafted and honed the polarized factions in a 
larger extent. In the following paragraphs, I seek to analyze, on the one hand, the 
consolidation of Al-Kettani’s Sufi-Salafist propaganda in uniting the tribal notables, and 
on the other hand, the role of cultural activism in carrying out his actions on site between 
1907 and 1909.  
The particular concentration on Mohammed Al-Kettani’s gradual process toward his 
Sufi-Salafist ideology not only drove, but also enlarged the scope of his protests against 
the French power and the competent ulama in Fes, manifesting new skills of propaganda 
and cultural mobilization writ large. These modernized tools of expression redefined how 
the realization of countering against various political factors was attainable. At the earlier 
																																																								
51	 For further details and inferences, see “Muttasawaf Istihwatihim Al-sulta al-rabia’a” in the 
Assabah website page.	
36	
phase of the French conquest in Morocco from around 1903, Mohammed Al-Kettani 
strove to oppose the encroachment of French power into Morocco. He founded the Arabic 
“The Plague” newspaper in order to counter the western influence on his country. He 
openly criticized “The Sa’ada,” an Arabic pro-Aziz newspaper launched in Tangier as the 
mouthpiece of French power in the beginning of the colonial conquest in Morocco 
between 1903 and 1904.52 On account of the incapability of Abdel-Aziz and his 
associated Islamic ulama in containing the French invasion, Al-Kettani was eager to 
broaden his mobilization through different approaches.  
Susan Miller has explicated the political focal point of Al-Kettani’s mobilizing power 
in that “he determined to present himself as an alternative to the reactionary ulama. He 
broke with tradition in other ways, too; he understood the power of the printed work and 
published and distributed political pamphlets, spreading news of his reformist agenda far 
and wide.”53 Setting the foundation and distribution of political pamphlets, agendas, and 
newspapers as a fulcrum point, Miller highlighted Al-Kettani’s “breaking up with 
tradition.” However, this has nothing to do with the abandonment of his Sufi tradition or 
ritual. Rather, the Sufi cheikh promoted his reformist agenda by “presenting himself as an 
alternative to the reactionary ulama.” As in stark contrast with the impotent Islamic 
authorities, Mohammed Al-Kettani emerged as an alternative figure in rooting out 
political corruption within the country and the colonial forces without. Put differently, the 
cornerstone of this “breaking up with tradition” reconstituted and reinforced his political 
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orientation, that is to say, the Sufi-Salafist viewpoint through western-style print culture. 
Indeed, his usage of both “The Plague” and “The Sa’ada” newspaper served as an 
operation of drawing greater popular support as an alternative to the feeble regime under 
Abdel-Aziz in 1907. 
 Moreover, and in terms of rallying popular support in the political field, Mohammed 
Al-Kettani underlined and adopted cultural production as an effective means to 
re-establish legitimacy and popularity. The pivotal aspect of expression via press and 
journalism had provided Al-Kettani a firm basis for fighting against political and 
religious inefficiency in Morocco, starting from 1904 and culminating in his death in 
1909.54 In particular, his denouncement of “The Saada” newspaper was clear and evident 
in defining and defending his mobilization. The newspaper insinuated that Al-Kettani was 
driven by political ambitions rather than religious zeal and that his religious leadership 
was therefore hypocritical. At the same time it suggested that the makhzan was 
underestimating the threat of the movement:  
The makhzan turned away from Al-Kettani, believing that the intention of the man 
was not for religion’s sake. Rather, he carried out other purposes while elevating his 
faith as a flag. Therefore, the makhzan did not watch the causes of the Sufi cheikh in 
an attentive way, nor did he monitor the case in a considerate manner. The makhzan 
itself knew what Al-Kettani was hiding from the sultan and from the Berbers.55 
This passage emphasizes the shady intentions of Al-Kettani. It also reveals that 
French administrators simply believed that he was eager to topple the Alaouite sultanate 
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and claimed it for himself after Abdel-Hafid. However, as biased as this 
French-sponsored and financed newspaper was, it still testifies to the power of 
Al-Kettani’s call for the greater jihad and his gathering of rural allies and Sufis. In stark 
contrast with the presumptions of the French, this mobilization manifested his goals of 
ensuring Sufi legitimacy and protecting the nation from corruption within and 
encroachment without. After all, the failure of Abdel-Hafid in fulfilling his conditional 
allegiance ignited the resistance and large-scale protests in the rural region. Henceforth, 
“The Sa’ada” newspaper, along with many other colonial journals and reports, distorted 
the attitude and goals of Mohammed Al-Kettani, which has led to prejudices, at best, and 
falsity, at worst, in the historical record. Al-Kettani’s denunciation of the biased “The 
Sa’ada” newspaper cemented the collective identity of the Sufi brotherhood and 
reinforced a shared consciousness of how opposition against the state could be expressed. 
 
Patriotic da’awa: the fortification of the baraka power 
Besides the powerful efficacy of and resistance against newspaper publication in 
rallying popular support from the rural area, Mohammed Al-Kettani had recourse to a 
collective calling, or da’awa, among fellow tribal notables and Sufi believers, in the hope 
of raising awareness and supporters to resist the Hafidiyya regime. More precisely, the 
collective da’awa “defines Muslim politics in the broadest sense of symbolic practice, 
persuasion, and transformation beyond the state’s formal intervention.”56 This calling 
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draws public attention to national security and religious legitimacy in light of domestic or 
outside threats. In the case of Mohammed Al-Kettani, the da’awa proved his symbolic 
weight as a guardian of Islam and an advocate of the greater jihad he had always striven 
for. The objective of this unifying communication was to call upon rural and Sufi 
supporters for his “authorial repetition—sainthood and the baraka power.” 57  The 
emphasis on his “sainthood” illustrated the spiritual unity to the whole Muslim/Sufi 
umma in the country in order to direct against the political order. The intersection of ritual 
call and national summons forged and reinforced the collective identity and shared 
consciousness of each Sufi during Al-Kettani’s “campaign” between 1908 and 1909. This 
deepening of relationships within the Kettaniyya brotherhood honed the inner cohesion of 
the Sufis as well as the religio-cultural defense of Sufi identity. This section seeks to 
explore French interest in Moroccan culture, not so much for its urban and political 
elitism than for its religious and rural mysticism, including Sufism and religious rituals 
within the peripheral regions in general. It would then trace the communicative power of 
the Sufi order, the da’awa, under the leadership of Mohammed Al-Kettani in reinforcing 
cohesion and unity among his Sufi allies. 
The French administrators had put much attention to and interest in the mystical 
aspect of the Sufi orders in general, which served as a springboard for their colonial 
project and undertaking in North Africa. I argue that this led to neglect of other 
dimensions of Sufi activity, such as, in the case of Mohammed Al-Kettani, its association 
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with the political struggle against the Alaouite sultanate between 1908 and 1909. 
According to remarks from a colonial report, “it seems that the deep taste of mystical 
obsessions was in accordance with sensual desire and infatuation.”58 What caught the 
eyes of the French administrators were the ritual performances of the Sufi communities in 
Morocco. Even though the comparison of their rituals to carnal and erotic “desire and 
infatuation” trivialized the role ritual played in the Sufi community, this aspect of 
religious practice intrigued the French into exploring more and even attempting to 
promote such customs, especially in the remotely rural regions.59 This support for the 
ritual aspect of Sufi tradition had several long-lasting implications, both to the colonizing 
forces and the Sufi groups.  
The French colonizers acknowledged that “Morocco was always the land for magic 
par excellence: magic has been preserved and developed with a very particular intensity 
in the context of fierce isolation and Moroccan obscurity.”60 The author of this journal 
page highlighted the unique characteristics of Sufi magic and ritual in Morocco. The 
word “isolation” conveyed the estrangement from the political atmosphere in the urban 
areas without and closeness of religious/mystical communities in the rural regions within; 
the term “obscurity” further attested to the strangeness and mystical aura of the “Sufi 
magic” par excellence. The French, given their denial of modern and civilized aspects of 
the Kettaniyya order, were eager to promote the mystical practices of the Sufi order not 
only to serve their own interest within their civilizing mission blueprint, but also to take 
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precaution against protests and resistance, which sprang from the sharifian state, the 
urban ulama, and other parties in the country, through the “military aid” of the Kettaniyya 
allies. Henceforth, Sufi ritual served as a foundation for Mohammed Al-Kettani’s forging 
of a shared identity within his Sufi disciples, which ultimately furthered their political 
aims, even if those are downplayed and misrepresented in French sources. 
In addition to ritual, another significant driving force of the collective consciousness 
of the Kettaniyya disciples was the national call, a communal da’awa for resistance. 
Regarding the communicative role of the call, the mobilizing force Al-Kettani transmitted 
echoed his disciples and other tribal leaders that were close to him either in distance or, 
religiously speaking, in soul, sending powerful messages in the name of Moroccans at 
large in the hope of resisting the incapable Abdel-Hafid. As mentioned before, the threat 
of Mohammed Al-Kettani stemmed from his questioning of Abdel-Hafid’s Alaouite 
legitimacy and position as Ameer Al-Moumineen. Although this suspicion had led to the 
marginalization of the Kettaniyya order, either in its religious practices or its political 
goal of reforming the sultanate, it strengthened the attraction of the movement among 
tribal and Sufi forces. Put differently, the impressive religious assemblage Al-Kettani 
called in order to carry out his national summon vis-à-vis the polarized factions enhanced 
his baraka power for national security and shared identity in a larger sense.  
As protest and resistance became the rallying cry for Sufis and tribal forces, 
“Al-Kittani, informed that he would lead some forces to Rabat, called for unification and 
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united power against the corrupted new regime.”61 The repercussion of this calling for a 
large-scale mobilization was twofold. On the one hand, the reorientation of the 
Kettaniyya allies highlighted the religious conflict in Islam (more specifically, the 
regional clash) within the country. On the other hand, the particular “calling for an united 
power” cemented collective consciousness among the tribal forces that Al-Kettani led, 
which served as an indispensable force for ensuring cohesion and organization in the 
building up of tribal elites.  
The cultural and political prestige of Mohammed Al-Kettani showcased his symbolic 
weight in guiding the allied army forward. Even so, the colonial archives had largely 
neglected the efforts of the Sufi leader in modernizing Morocco, using “biased terms” for 
the sake of advancing their own colonial projects, Indeed, I suggest that Al-Kettani’s 
religious and political legitimacy became manifested in his baraka power in calling upon 
Sufi cohesion, less so in a “militant” objective than in pursuing a “spiritual pathway” and 
da’awa.   
The French journal explained that the shared identity within the heart of the 
Kettaniyya brotherhood under the leadership of Al-Kettani was born “not of simple 
political adversity, but outright demagoguery.”62 The term “demagoguery” had strongly 
distorted Al-Kettani’s original intention on prioritizing his Sufi spiritual struggle against 
the failed regime of the Alaouite sultanate. One should not downplay the Sufi cheikh’s 
role as a symbolic capital of the united rural forces for national security and religious 
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legitimacy. It is true that the contentious nature between him and Abdel-Hafid reinforced 
the shared consciousness of Sufi followers, but the collective da’awa functioned as a 
cornerstone of furthering social forces and cohesion among his cohorts. In a larger sense, 
the national call summoned Moroccans across regions; it “promoted the social evolution 
of the Moroccan People as it emphasized the cultural symbol as repeated and 
recognizable source of the call, in which the marginal practices now amassed to form a 
national practice.”63 The transcendence of regional and “marginal” space consolidated a 
variety of Sufi orders aligning with Mohammed Al-Kettani for the sake of carrying out 
“social evolution” and communicative effects.64 Henceforth, one can perceive the hidden 
power of the Sufi cheikh when confronting with different opposing parties since his 
adoption of ritual call and Sufi da’awa highlighted the communal consciousness of the 
Sufi community. 
The power of the political climate of the Kettaniyya brotherhood lay on the practice 
of baraka, the divine grace and blessing, of the leader Mohammed Al-Kettani himself. 
More specifically, he wielded saintly/religious tool as an effective means to gather 
national and religious call among his community. This notion is evident from two 
different scenes in which the Sufi cheikh had used (the means) for political ends. Before 
marching his Sufi and tribal groups to claim the sultanate of Abdel-Hafid, “Sufi groups, 
such as those Mohammed Al-Kettani led, brought a swarm of people passed by and, in 
order to accomplish their goals, they had to visit the tomb and the marabout of Moulay 
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Idris.” 65  From this remark, one can clearly perceive that Mohammed Al-Kettani 
convened and called up his forces before the tomb of Moulay Idrisside in order to receive 
baraka. The potential premise of summoning up Sufi disciples attached the divine grace 
to recognition of national benefits and religious legitimacy, tightening the collective 
consciousness within his Sufi disciples. In the second scenario, however, the same 
mobilization of troops had aimed for a massive protest against the failed regime and 
performance of Abdel-Hafid, whose actions greatly disappointed Mohammed Al-Kettani.  
In this particular turning point, Mohammed Al-Kettani “summoned up his troops and 
cavaliers with about 100 mules, fully charged and equipped, and passed by the house of 
Zemmour, Beni Mtir, and headed towards Moulay Hafid.”66 Again, the highly visible 
mobilizing power of the Sufi leader against the Alaouite sultan and his allies paved the 
road for a greater mobilization power. Consequently, one should not ignore the 
religio-political and cultural implications behind the massive mobilization of Mohammed 
Al-Kettani. The baraka power, his ritual practices, and coherent da’awa of tribal and Sufi 
forces had incited the academic taste of the French administrators. More importantly, the 
power relation of the Sufi leader manifested his patriotic and religious defense in 
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Conclusion 
Through the detailed analysis and examination of Mohammed Al-Kettani’s 
tremendous contribution to the transformation of the makhzan system and unification of 
the Kettaniyya community, it has become more apparent that the exceptional role of his 
representation shaped and honed a shared consciousness among his cohorts. Al-Kettani’s 
involvement in the Hafidiyya regime reflected his active participation in the political 
domain in the early 20th century. The Sufi leader adopted the spiritual jihad in challenging 
the political structures of the Alaouite sultan, in light of ensuring religious legitimacy of 
his order and protecting the nation from disruptive forces. His religious struggle, 
including the introduction and preservation of the baraka, modeled the way the religious 
vitality was a vital drive to counter the failed regime. He furthered this influence by 
seeking political alliances with rural notables and Sufi disciples, which cemented the 
coherent power.  
The pursuit of Mohammed Al-Kettani of “the spiritual pathway” had strengthened 
his role as a devout Sufi among his cohorts, allies, and disciples. The greater jihad was a 
defining feature not only in reinforcing his religious legitimacy and the baraka power 
within the rural region, but also marked the political rift with Abdel-Hafid, whom 
Al-Kettani believed had tremendously threatened the safety of his nation. Broadly 
speaking, the symbolic capital of the Sufi cheikh in connecting and unifying his religious 
community together serves as a significant agent in hardening the ties with his allies. His 
usage of print culture and collective da’awa had great success in the rural arena. The 
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cultural and political agenda he formulated substantially strengthened his ability to bring 
about a massive mobilization and spiritual struggle for both national and religious causes.  
The complex dynamics of power relations in Morocco is worthy of attention in the 
viewpoints of western scholars, whose eyes have grown used to projecting simplistic and 
Orientalist binaries of “Western advancement” and “Oriental backwardness.”67 In the 
case of the Islamic societies, such as Morocco, there is no room left for progress and 
development in their representation of Islamic history and culture other than static and 
constant Islamic concepts, including Sufi thoughts and interpretative tradition of the 
urban scholarly classes. Despite all these essentialist and idealist conception of the 
Islamic world and the Orient, it is indispensable to accentuate, in the Kettaniyya context, 
the creative element in Sufi cultures and histories in fighting against intellectual and 
political hegemony over the so-called “Other.” After all, would the religio-political 
objective of Sufism act as an effective antidote to modern-era Islamism and Islamist 
ideology, in light of its emphasis on religious legitimacy and national defense? Under the 
far-flung influence of radical Islamism, would Mohammed VI, the now Moroccan king, 
seek reconciliation with rural notables and Sufis in order to root out domestic and 
international threats of various kinds? Scholarly investigation on Mohammed Al-Kettani 
as a historical and religious agent has the merit of and opens the door for reinterpreting 
the nexus between religion and political agenda.	 	
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